EVOLUTIONARY MODEL OF STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF A REGIONAL INVESTMENT PROJECT

Authors

  • M.M. Kuryliuk Vasyl Stefanyk Carpathian (Precarpathian) National University, Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, Department of Economic Cybernetics, Shevchenka str., 57, Ivano-Frankivsk, 76000, Ukraine https://orcid.org/0009-0004-4738-6067

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15330/apred.2.21.169-179

Keywords:

investment project, region, evolutionary model, strategies, sustainable development

Abstract

This article analyzes the strategic decisions regarding a regional investment project in conditions of stakeholder interaction. A three-way evolutionary game model between central and local authorities and the investor is constructed. Strategies for evolutionary stability are analyzed, the influence of various factors on the choice of a three-side strategy is also determined, and the stability of equilibrium in the evolutionary game system is determined. It is assumed that in the process of an evolutionary game, all stakeholders adhere to a familiar strategy of behavior, do not predict future behavioral choices, but only analyze existing strategies of other stakeholders, and at the same time, the choice of strategies is carried out under the influence of the external environment and other factors, and the information of the parties is incomplete. Central authorities (administrative and managerial side) have strategies that consist in intervention or non-intervention at the stage of making an investment decision on the implementation of a regional project. Local authorities (local self-government) have strategies that consist in conducting or not conducting negotiations by representatives of local authorities regarding the investment project. The investor has strategies based on self-interest and public interest needs. The first strategy is to support the sustainable development of the region with public interest in mind, which is called support, and the second strategy is to take self-interest more into account. The results show that the lower the cost of intervention and the reward for both parties, and the high opportunity cost of non-intervention, the more likely the central government will choose the intervention strategy. Increasing the negotiation gains, non-negotiation costs, and non-negotiation losses, as well as decreasing the negotiation costs and negotiation gains, contribute to the convergence time of the local government's choice of negotiation strategy. Increasing rewards and penalties, increasing the support gains, losses and decreasing the non-support gains, additional support costs will contribute to the convergence of the investor's choice of support strategy.

Author Biography

M.M. Kuryliuk , Vasyl Stefanyk Carpathian (Precarpathian) National University, Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, Department of Economic Cybernetics, Shevchenka str., 57, Ivano-Frankivsk, 76000, Ukraine

Postgraduate student

References

Zvarych, I., and O. Zvarych. “Mechanism of investment development of the region.” Tavria Scientific Bulletin. Series: Economics, no.4, 2020, pp. 37-50.

Wu, L., Jia, G., and N. Mackhaphonh. “Case study on improving the effectiveness of public participation in public infrastructure megaprojects.” J. Construct. Eng., Manag., vol. 145, iss. 4, 2019. ascelibrary.org/doi/10.1061/%28ASCE%29CO.1943-7862.0001623. Accessed 18 Mar. 2025.

He, Z.Q., Huang, D.C., Fang, J.M., and B. Wang. “Stakeholder conflict amplification of large-scale engineering projects in China: an evolutionary game model on complex networks.” Complexity, vol. 2020, 2020. onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1155/2020/9243427. Accessed 18 Mar. 2025.

Li, T.H.Y., Ng, S.T., and M. Skitmore. “Modeling multi-stakeholder multi-objective decisions during public participation in major infrastructure and construction projects: a decision rule approach.” J. Construct. Eng. Manag., vol. 142, iss. 3, 2016, ascelibrary.org/doi/10.1061/%28ASCE%29CO.1943-7862.0001066. Accessed 18 Mar. 2025.

Danchenko, O., and N. Fedotova. “Review of modern models and methods of conflict management in projects.” Management of complex systems development, no.60, 2024, pp. 44-55.

Gumeniuk, Ya., and Z. Tkachov. “Investments in sustainable development: world practice and prospects for Ukraine.” Economy and society, no. 67, 2024. economyandsociety.in.ua/index.php/journal/article/view/4750. Accessed 18 Mar. 2025.

Mitchell, R.K., Agle, B.R., and D.J. Wood. “Toward a theory of stakeholder identification and salience: defining the principle of who and what really counts.” Acad. Manag. Rev., vol. 22, no. 4, 1997, pp. 853-886.

Toor, S., and S.O. Ogunlana. “Beyond the ’iron triangle’: stakeholder perception of key performance indicators (KPIs) for large-scale public sector development projects.” Int. J. Proj. Manag., vol. 28, no. 3, 2010, pp. 228-236.

Kanova, O. A., Kryvobok, K. V., and E. Sh. Omarov., “Conflict management in entrepreneurship: strategies, communication and leadership.” Ukrainian Journal of Applied Economics and Technology, vol. 9, no. 2, 2024, pp. 128-133.

Shiyan, A.A. Game Theory: Fundamentals and Applications in Economics and Management. VNTU, 2009.

Oleshko, T.I., and B.I. Klymenko. “Modeling the investment process based on game theory.” Market infrastructure, no. 9, 2018, pp. 578-582.

Kononskyi S. I. “Methods of modeling regional investment policy.” Economic analysis, vol. 16, no. 2, 2014, pp. 19-24.

Slushaenko, N. V. “Modeling the investment security of regional development.” Bulletin of the Zaporizhzhia National University: Economic Sciences, no. 1(5), 2010, pp. 112-115.

Lehr, C.B., Thun, J.H., and P.M. Milling. “From waste to value - a system dynamics model for strategic decision-making in closed-loop supply chains.” Int. J. Prod. Res., vol. 51, no. 13, 2013, pp. 4105-4116.

Forrester, J.W. “System dynamics - a personal view of the first fifty years.” Syst. Dynam. Rev., vol. 23, iss. 2-3, 2007, pp. 345-358.

Published

2025-06-16

How to Cite

Kuryliuk , M. (2025). EVOLUTIONARY MODEL OF STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF A REGIONAL INVESTMENT PROJECT. The Actual Problems of Regional Economy Development, 2(21), 169–179. https://doi.org/10.15330/apred.2.21.169-179